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closing the “lippmann gap” and the future of  
american grand strategy
Karl Walling
American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump, by Hal Brands� 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2018� 256 pages� 
$25�99 (paperback)�
Republic in Peril: American Empire and the Liberal Tradition, 
by David Hendrickson� New York: Oxford Univ� Press, 2017� 
304 pages� $34�95�
These two books reach dramatically different conclusions, but both authors start 
from similar premises� David Hendrickson is deeply rooted in what one might 
call the Old Testament in American foreign policy: as the American founders 
established it, with a heavy emphasis on neutrality and nonintervention in for-
eign conflicts—that is, restraint� Hal Brands is no less rooted in what one might 
call the New Testament in American grand strategy: as practiced from the Cold 
War to the present, and focused on preserving 
the post–World War II, American-led liberal in-
ternational order, which he sees as dependent on 
continued American primacy�
Each man is troubled by heresy, so to speak, 
with Hendrickson fearful that the American peo-
ple have come to worship the “golden calf of em-
pire” and Brands worried that in the age of Presi-
dent Trump they will throw away all they built 
from the rubble of the Second World War� This 
quasi-religious terminology seems appropriate, 
because both Hendrickson and Brands understand 
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that—whatever partisan differences Americans may have—American grand 
strategy depends on a consensus akin to what Abraham Lincoln called a “po-
litical religion” about what the strategy is for� Both authors agree on something 
fundamental, made famous at the dawn of the Cold War by the journalist Walter 
Lippmann: that the grand strategic dimension of foreign policy entails “bringing 
into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s com-
mitments and the nation’s power” (Brands, p� 128; Hendrickson, pp� 172–75)�
As Brands discusses the issue, there are three generic solutions to this prob-
lem: (1) “decrease commitments, thereby restoring equilibrium with diminished 
resources”; (2) “live with greater risk,” either by gambling that adversaries will 
not test vulnerable commitments or by employing riskier approaches, such as 
nuclear escalation or cyber warfare, to “sustain commitments on the cheap”; or 
(3) “expand capabilities and thereby restore strategic solvency” (Brands, p� 128)�
Moreover, both writers express some admiration for Richard Nixon and Henry
Kissinger for attempting a grand strategic reassessment meant to correct Ameri-
can overextension by reducing some commitments and shifting some burdens to
American allies during the Vietnam War (Brands, pp� 115, 118, 140; Hendrick-
son, pp� 175–80)� The difference is that Hendrickson stresses reducing commit-
ments, while Brands stresses increasing capabilities, to close what can be called
the Lippmann Gap� In theory, either solution might work; but which is best?
That depends, in part, on how one understands what grand strategy is for� 
Hendrickson is emphatic: Americans have lost their way� Like an Old Testament 
prophet, he tries to recall us to the original covenant� Primacy, or empire, was 
never the ultimate purpose of the American republic� The purpose of the Ameri-
can regime is to secure republican liberty, not everywhere—however much one 
might wish well to those who seek it elsewhere—but at home, with the survival 
of liberty in America a beacon of hope to those other places� So Hendrickson 
stresses the primacy of domestic policy� All grand strategic decisions must be 
evaluated not merely in terms of how well they secure life and material prosperity 
but, ultimately, and most fundamentally, in terms of how well they secure liberty 
for ourselves and our posterity�
Like Brands, Hendrickson is aware that the pursuit of continued primacy, or 
the ability to dominate in any conflict, has animated the grand strategic visions 
of every American president since the end of the George H� W� Bush adminis-
tration� Both agree that there is far more continuity than change in this pursuit; 
usually disagreements occur over different emphases� These include soft versus 
hard power; with allied support or not; and through forward presence in Europe, 
Asia, and the Middle East, at the risk of encouraging free riders, or by some light 
footprint meant to limit American liability and avoid local and international 
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blowback� For Hendrickson, however, the primary issue is how well these ap-
proaches serve liberty at home and American principles of liberty abroad�
Hendrickson is damning in his critique of primacy as a threat to just about 
everything the American republic is meant to stand for� Empires tend to need 
emperors—which leads to imperial presidencies� Since September 11, 2001, 
presidents have used the original authorization to use military force against Al 
Qaeda to justify interventions, well, almost everywhere in Northeast Asia, the 
Middle East, and Africa, and Congress has failed to provide a serious check� 
And the increasing growth of the national security state—what Dwight D� Eisen-
hower, who was no liberal, called the military-industrial complex—constitutes an 
enormous transfer of power to unaccountable elites� Drunk on the ideology of 
spreading democracy everywhere, Americans, as John Quincy Adams long ago 
warned might happen, have gone abroad in search of monsters to destroy but 
have become monsters themselves, wreaking havoc with unnecessary wars and 
creating anarchy in Libya and Iraq in the name of regime change�
So Hendrickson advocates restraint, although it looks a lot like retrenchment� 
Fearful of aggravating conflict further, he suggests that American grand strategy 
focus on avoiding giving unnecessary offense� It would be prudent, he thinks, for 
the United States to adopt a policy of self-limitation—which others might see as 
accepting spheres of influence, for Russia and China especially� War with a resur-
gent Russia and a rising China would be less likely if the United States changed 
its policy, and also its strategy� Forward deployments of American military forces 
give unnecessary offense and should be minimized� Maritime strategies to fight 
anywhere near the coast of China are unduly provocative and probably doomed 
to fail, while attritional strategies on the high seas have better odds of success� 
Consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, the United States should shift the burden 
of defense and deterrence as much as possible onto regional allies, and hold its 
forces in reserve until required� Hendrickson’s approach, by limiting American 
reach, might prevent strategic overextension, which he sees in political more than 
military or economic terms� The more the United States acts like an empire, the 
greater the threat to the republic, so restraint is essential to the true purposes of 
an American grand strategy�
Not so fast, says Brands, to all advocates of restraint today� Yes, the Iraq War was 
almost certainly a mistake, but the New Testament in American grand strategy 
has accomplished unprecedented good� The American-led liberal international 
order has prevented great-power war—the greatest killer in history—since 1945; 
that is, for over seventy years� In Europe and Asia especially, this has produced a 
security community with a degree of wealth and liberty almost unimaginable a 
hundred years ago� It is based on two premises: the reality of security, economic, 
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and other forms of interdependence; and the continuing indispensability of the 
United States as the hegemon (not to be confused with emperor) of a voluntary 
and usually cooperative network of alliances, in Europe and Asia especially, and 
more problematically in the Middle East�
Of course, Hendrickson, like many other advocates of restraint, does not want 
to throw this extraordinary accomplishment away; he supports preserving the 
American network of regional alliances, but at the lowest possible level of cost, 
risk, and effort, to minimize the dangers the national security state might pose to 
liberty at home� In contrast, Brands warns against attempting to hold the liberal 
international order together on the cheap� Prudence requires understanding that 
as Americans retrench, allies may not pick up the slack, or even might “bandwag-
on” over to the side of challengers� And Brands is at his best critiquing theories 
of offshore balancing and limited liability as ways of closing the Lippmann Gap� 
Maybe retrenchment might lower short-term costs, but it also might increase 
the risks that other powers will fill a vacuum, which would lead to higher costs 
later if Americans decided to reintervene, as they did in Iraq after the rise of ISIS� 
Costs might be lower with a sustained, minimal presence in theaters deemed stra-
tegically vital to the United States—but only maybe� So Brands is unapologetic 
in insisting that the best grand strategy for our time is to increase capabilities 
substantially—on the level of the increase of the Carter and Reagan administra-
tions, that is, by 50 percent, although he insists this would amount to no more 
than 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), much lower than during the 
hottest periods of the Cold War� So, ironically, he too seems to think there are 
cheap solutions to America’s grand strategic problems�
In truth, both Hendrickson and Brands are living in semi-ideal worlds� Even 
in the age of President Trump, the option of Lippmann’s that Americans are most 
likely to pick—deliberately or through inertia—is the one about which neither 
Hendrickson nor Brands talks much: accepting higher risk� Americans do not yet 
wish to downgrade commitments to the level Hendrickson advises, nor to pay 
the cost of increased capabilities at the level Brands advocates� This is obviously a 
dangerous predicament, but not unlike those of the Cold War, when, to cut costs, 
Americans accepted greater risks by threatening massive nuclear retaliation and 
the escalation that might ensue�
But, as Clausewitz teaches, strategy, even grand strategy, is about the imagina-
tive search for options, and then selecting the best, according to such criteria as 
cost, risk, theory of victory, and probability of success� Brands is so much a part of 
the New Testament orthodoxy, and so fearful of the heresies of the 2016 election 
and its aftermath, that he says nothing—absolutely nothing—about the dangers 
to the American republic arising from the quest for primacy� And Brands is too 
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facile on the subject of “democracy promotion” as an end of American grand 
strategy� As a student of John Quincy Adams, Hendrickson is all too aware that 
this can lead, and often has led, to a form of democratic imperialism incompat-
ible with American principles, rightly understood� Yes, the Old Testament is old, 
but it is not “overcome by events�” It is still worth reading precisely because it calls 
us back to first principles�
Are there any other grand strategic options? Of course� One such might split 
the profound difference between Hendrickson and Brands� It would accept 
the necessity of primacy, but not at all times and all places against everyone—
a recipe for strategic overextension and moral decline, with the United States 
risking emulating the Roman Republic in becoming a new Roman Empire� It 
would suffice for the United States to be primus inter pares (first among equals) 
within the liberal order, which it built, not altruistically, but to serve American 
security and principles� Limited primacy—to lead a coalition, not to dominate 
the globe—might preserve the liberal international order, so long as burdens are 
adjusted more equitably�
Hard military power is largely a function of economic power� Today, the Unit-
ed States produces 24 percent of global GDP; the European Union 23 percent; 
Japan 4�1 percent; and South Korea 1�8 percent—the latter the same as resurgent 
Russia’s! China has 18�5 percent, and its share is growing; but, given its demo-
graphics and other problems, how long that will remain true is unclear� Throw 
in some other possible allies, such as India or Vietnam, and the United States 
and its current allies—sometimes called the West, even when some reside in the 
East—are still in the catbird seat�
These countries just have to work together as members of a team—a question-
able proposition in current political circumstances, but not inconsistent with 
practice since the end of the Second World War� It just requires the United States 
to lead, rather than divide, its own team�
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sea power does europe still get it?
Martin N. Murphy
The Decline of European Naval Forces: Challenges to Sea Power 
in an Age of Fiscal Austerity and Political Uncertainty, by 
Jeremy Stöhs� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018� 290 
pages� $36�95�
This is a lucid tour d’horizon of a dispiriting subject: Europe’s navies� With the 
partial exceptions of the British and French navies, and the peculiar exceptions 
of Norway and Sweden—which exist under the dark shadow of Russia—all other 
European navies have suffered from deliberate neglect, wishful thinking, and 
poor decision-making� Furthermore, they appear to view the world as Europe’s 
politicians want it to be rather than as it is�
Underpinning all this credulity is the assumption that America will ride to 
Europe’s rescue; most of Europe’s navies could not operate without at least some 
degree of U�S� support� President Donald J� Trump’s harsh warning that North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies—Germany especially—need to in-
crease their defense spending should be repeated regularly until they do� They 
should not see the U�S� Defense Department’s recent actions—deliberations 
about whether to maintain a carrier regularly in the Mediterranean to counter 
an increasingly assertive Russian naval presence in the region and the announce-
ment from the Chief of Naval Operations that the Second Fleet will be reestab-
lished because of the marked rise in Russian submarine activity in the North 
Atlantic—as excuses to believe that things have returned to some faux–Cold War 
normal and they once again can shelter under a U�S� umbrella�
To be sure, Russia is breathing down Europe’s neck, but it is China that pre-
sents the real danger� The world’s seas are gaining importance: for trade, fish, 
energy, minerals, and, of course, great-power confrontation� Key to all these is sea 
control underpinned, from a Western perspective, by a freedom of the seas that 
China is seeking to deny to others except on its own terms� The front line lies in 
the waters around Taiwan, stretching down into the South China Sea and slowly 
extending into the eastern Indian Ocean�
So far, the only state standing in China’s way 
is the United States, with Japan in support� The 
United States already is concentrating its forces 
in the Indo-Pacific theater and making it clear 
that it is looking to other states to join it and 
Martin N. Murphy is a research fellow at the Corbett 
Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at King’s College 
London and an associate fellow of the Royal United 
Services Institute.
© 2018 by Martin N� Murphy
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internationalize the pushback against the fundamental threat that China presents 
to the existing global maritime order� Europe’s problem, in other words, is that 
not only is the United States largely leaving Europe to fend for itself in its own 
waters, but it is expecting its allies to join the only fight that counts (pp� 18–19, 
23, 27)�
Britain and France alone are taking steps to support the United States and 
Japan� However, the help they can provide is largely moral, given the damage 
that a quarter century of cuts has imposed on their fleets and absent a substantial 
recommitment to their naval capabilities� Unless other navies join this effort and 
their political leaders support it, then, as Stöhs writes, Europe will have “relegated 
itself to the outer fringes of a world centered on the Pacific” (p� 8)�
Stöhs, who is an analyst at Kiel University’s Institute for Security Policy and 
an adjunct at its Center for Maritime Strategy and Security, describes his main 
objective as giving readers an insight into the developments and changes that 
have occurred in Europe’s navies since the end of the Cold War� He succeeds ad-
mirably� He examines all of Europe’s principal naval powers comparatively from 
a platform-centric point of view, using graphs to illustrate the steep declines in 
their military expenditure and warship numbers�
Stöhs shows how little Europe’s current navies resemble their Cold War prede-
cessors� Britain and France remain powerful, but even they are no longer in the 
first rank of naval powers� The disappearance of the Soviet threat after 1991 left 
politicians across the continent eager to spend the so-called peace dividend and 
their navies scrambling for something to justify their existence�
Like the U�S� Navy, they mostly found that justification in power projection 
and expeditionary operations, first in Iraq and later in support of humanitarian 
assistance and the war on terror� However, each of these functions sacrificed 
the skills and equipment to fulfill traditional naval missions, a decline that is 
most noticeable at the upper end of the conflict spectrum� Germany is the most 
egregious example; effectively, it is taking advantage of its neighbors’ sea power 
as Europe collectively takes advantage of the sea power of the United States� As 
Stöhs puts it, numerous indicators suggest that “Germany will remain unwill-
ing to conduct any form of high-intensity warfighting in the foreseeable future” 
(p� 129)� In other words, although naval forces across Europe look powerful on 
paper, that strength—with the partial exceptions of Britain and France—is con-
centrated at the lower level of the intensity scale�
This stands in stark contrast with Indo-Pacific navies that are configured for 
war fighting� Europe’s smaller navies, moreover, have continued the Cold War 
practice of niche specialization as an answer to inadequate funding� To make that 
work, great strides have been made to improve interoperability� However, what 
was justifiable and practical as part of NATO in the face of the relatively narrow 
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range of Cold War threats looks imprudent now in the face of challenges that are 
less predictable and more distant� Many European states rely on the naval forces 
of neighbors (and the United States) to fill capability gaps to make them relevant 
at all (pp� 187–89)�
This is an important and timely book� Europe lies on the periphery of Amer-
ica’s vision� It catches our eye largely because of Russia’s newfound adventurism� 
Yet it remains important to us, not least because of the growing confrontation 
with China that is driven by rival values as well as by rival power� Europe should 
be our ally� Given the importance of the sea in future power balances, economic 
as well as geopolitical, and Europe’s reliance on the sea for its own economic well-
being, our mutual interest should be obvious across a continent whose history is 
so rooted in sea power�
But it is not� As Stöhs notes, it is difficult to persuade any nation’s taxpayers 
of the sea’s importance, especially in the absence of clear political leadership, 
and across Europe that leadership, political and military, cannot agree on com-
mon goals (pp� 182, 192)� These divisions well may widen when Britain leaves 
the European Union (EU) and the European Commission attempts to boost its 
much-vaunted “defense union” at the expense of NATO�
NATO operates on consensus, which it is hard to believe will extend to the 
East Asia littoral absent a clear and present danger, a recognition that is muddied 
by the economic leverage that China has gained over powerful political interests 
in several member states� The EU, despite its political posturing, is largely irrel-
evant for the moment� If that changes, from a defense perspective as it already 
has from an economic one, Europe is likely to become more insular, less global, 
and even less naval in its outlook�
Sea power, both economic and military, will play a critical role in the world’s 
future� The question Stöhs raises (p� 6) for Europe is: Whose sea power will it be?
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